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In his dissent in Wisconsin v. Yoder, the case upholding
Amish parents' right to withdraw their children from high
school for religious reasons, Justice Douglas challenged the
Court's focus on the rights of parents.' In his view, "if an
Amish child desires to attend high school, and is mature
enough to have that desire respected, the State may well be
able to override the parents' religiously motivated objec-
tions."2 To ascertain the child's desires, Douglas suggested
that the State should simply ask her what she thinks.' While
I share Douglas's view that the Yoder decision is deficient in
its account of children's rights, I think Douglas's cure is
worse than the disease. We should have no confidence that
the State, in interjecting itself into a child's development of a
religious identity with its clumsy, uninvited questions, will
further the rights of children, let alone improve their lives.
In the three decades since its publication, Douglas's dis-
sent has served as a beacon for those calling for the recogni-
tion of children's rights independent of the rights of their par-
ents.' While the implications of his argument extend to any
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See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205. 241-49 (1972) (Douglas. J.. dissenting).
2 Id. at 242.
3 See icl. at 244. 246 n.4 (noting that "oin the important and vital matter of edu-
cation, I think the children should be entitled to be heard' and calling for the 'can-
vassing [oil the views of all school-age Amish children").
4 See, e.g., David Orentlicher, Spanking and Other Corporal Punishment of Chil-
dren by Parents: Overvaluing Pain, Undervaluing Children. 35 HOUs. L REV. 1478
(1998) (exempting Justice Douglas's dissent in Yoder from his general criticism of the
law's undervaluation of children); Catherine J. Ross. From Vulnerability to Voke: Ap-
pointing Counsel for Children in Civil Litigation. 64 FORDHAM L REV. 1571. 1587
(1996) (citing Justice Douglas's dissent in support of her argument that children
should be represented by counsel in judicial proceedings affecting their interests).
Catherine Grevers Schmidt, Where Privacy Falls: Equal Protection and the Abortion
Right of Minors, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 597, 630 (1993) (citing Justice Douglas's dissent to
support her argument for expanding mature minors' abortion rights): Leslie A.
Fithian, Note, Forcible Repatriation of Minors: The Competing Rights of Parent and
Child, 37 STAN. L. REV. 187. 204 (1984) (citing Justice Douglas as the first Supreme
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context in which parents and children disagree on important
matters directly affecting the conduct of their lives, the Issues
are presented particularly starkly in the context of religion.
Parents' rights receive enhanced protection from State inter-
ference in this context because controlling religious upbring-
ing is considered one of the core aspects of parenting.5 I
therefore choose as my focus the particular question of
whether and to what extent we should afford children the op-
portunity to make religious choices that conflict with the
views of their parents.
The facts of Yoder are exotic (the Amish believe they are
obligated to hold themselves apart from modem society in all
aspects of life), but the questions Douglas raises are applica-
ble in any case in which parents seek to avoid the application
of a law to their children on the basis of the parents' religious
convictions. Moreover, the same basic issues arise in the
much more mundane context of divorce where parents are di-
vided on questions of religious upbringing and one parent
asks the court to intervene to compel the other parent to en-
gage, or refrain from engaging, in particular religious educa-
tion or practices. In this context, parents sometimes ask the
court to consider the religious beliefs of the child in making
its decision.6 How the court responds will again be affected
by whether it concludes that the child has independent relig-
Court Justice to press for the recognition of children's rights independent of their
parents and calling for a recognition of such rights in the context of forcible repa-
triation); Patrick Henigan, Note, Is Parental Authority Absolute? Public High Schools
Which Provide Gay and Lesbian Youth Services Do Not Violate the Constitutional Chil-
drearing Rights of Parents, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1261, 1290 (1996) (citing Justice
Douglas's dissent to support the contention that students should be given access to
information regarding gay and lesbian services, despite opposition of parents); see
also In re Green, 292 A.2d 387, 391 (Pa. 1972) (citing Douglas's dissent as authority
for its decision to remand a case considering a mother's refusal to consent to a medl-
cal procedure for her child to allow the trial court to take testimony on the child's
viewpoint).
5 See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214 (describing the "traditional interest of parents with
respect to the religious upbringing of their children," as fundamental and noting that
the State's interest must be particularly strong to justify an intrusion on "the inter-
ests of parenthood [when] combined with a free exercise claim"); Prince v. Massachu-
setts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944) ('The parent's conflict with the State over control of
the child and his training is serious enough when only secular matters are con-
cerned. It becomes the more so when an element of religious conviction enters."). In
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881-
82 (1990), the Court suggested that the right protected in Yoder was a "hybrid" of
two fundamental rights, the right of parents to direct their children's education, and
the right of free exercise, which, joined together were entitled to more protection than
a free exercise claim standing alone.
6 See, e.g., Martin v. Martin, 123 N.E.2d 812 (N.Y. 1954) (per curiam) (consider-
ing mother's motion to modify the custody order based on her son's testimony about
his preference not to be educated in a religious school).
[Vol. 2:1I
FRIEDA YODER
ious rights and what efforts it is willing to make to elicit the
child's religious views.
In this paper, I will consider two questions; first, whether
children should be afforded rights of religious exercise inde-
pendent of their parents; and, second, what approach the
State should take in bringing childrens religious views to
light. I will address these two questions both as they arise in
Yoder and in the custody context. After discussing the
courts' consideration of children's interests in these contexts,
and then the courts' consideration of children's constitutional
rights in a range of other contexts, I will tentatively conclude
that affording children free exercise rights independent of,
and therefore even when in conflict with, their parents, can
be justified under current doctrine. I will go on to argue,
however, that the State will do more harm than good if it
plays an active role in eliciting children's religious views.
Drawing on my view of the strengths and weaknesses of the
judicial bypass procedure for minors developed by the Su-
preme Court in the abortion context, I will suggest an ap-
proach to both classes of cases which strikes a balance be-
tween the recognition of children's religious rights on the one
hand and the avoidance of destructive intervention by the
State in a child's ongoing process of development on the
other.
I. PROTECTING CHILDREN'S INTERESTS WITHOUT
REGARD TO THEIR RIGHTS
A. Parents' Claims Against the State
The traditional analysis applied to cases in which parents
assert a free exercise right to avoid the application of a law
affecting the upbringing of their children looks to the sincer-
ity and centrality of the parents' religious beliefs, and the
strength of the State's interest in the law's universal applica-
tion.7 Where a court determines that the parents' beliefs are
sincerely held and that the imposition of the State's require-
ment would significantly compromise the exercise of those
beliefs, the court is required to exempt parents from that im-
position, unless the State demonstrates that its interests are
compelling and the requirement in question is narrowly tai-
7 See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214 (asserting that the strength of a States Interest in
universal education should be balanced against the free exercise rights of parents to
control the religious upbringing of their children).
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lored to achieve those interests.' As described here, and as
discussed in Yoder and numerous other court decisions, this
analysis is framed as a conflict between the State and the
parents.9 The balancing test does not mention the child.
In fairness to the Yoder analysis, however, the test can be
more fully described as a means of assessing the State's and
the parents' competing claims to decide what practices best
serve children's interests. The parents' interest in controlling
the child's religious upbringing is driven, in large part, by the
parent's concern for the child's religious and more general
well-being,'" and the State's interest in circumscribing that
control rests on its own interest in facilitating children's
healthy and successful development." Although these may
not be the only interests the parties are seeking to protect in
the litigation,' the child's interests clearly play a central role
in both parties' positions.
While the majority in Yoder does account for children's
interests in this indirect manner, Justice Douglas is correct
in noting the lack of any attention to children's rights."' The
majority's balancing test considers the competing contentions
of surrogates, who take positions on the child's behalf, but it
8 Id. at 221 (outlining the balancing test applied by the majority in Yoder).
9 See, e.g., Murphy v. Arkansas, 852 F.2d 1039 (8th Cir. 1988) (asking whether
the Arkansas Home School Act interferes with plaintiff parents' free exercise rights
and if so, whether the infringement is Justified as serving a compelling State inter-
est).
10 See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 209 (noting that Amish parents believed that sending
their children to high school would endanger their children's salvation as well as
their own); see also Stephen Gilles, Liberal Parentalism and Children's Educational
Rights, 26 CAP. U. L. REV. 9 (1997) (advancing a theory of "liberal parentalism" which
calls for broad deference to parental decision making on matters of upbringing,
based on the view that "parents are more likely than the State or its agents faithfully
to discover and pursue the child's welfare").
I See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944) (describing the State's
interests that weigh against the recognition of parental free exercise claims as "the
interest of youth itself, and of the whole community, that children be safeguarded
from abuses and given opportunities for growth into free and independent well-
developed men and citizens").
12 See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 209, 221 (noting testimony indicating that Amish par-
ents feared that allowing Amish children to go to school would threaten their own
salvation and the survival of the Amish community, and noting that States' interests
in their children's education was tied to societal interests in maintaining an effective
government and avoiding dependence).
13 The majority opinion expressly eschews any consideration of the scope of clill-
dren's religious rights, or rights to attend school against their parents wishes, con-
cluding that the issue was not properly before the Court in this case, which chal-
lenged the validity of their fathers' criminal convictions. See Id. at 230-31. The
majority does suggest, however, that a State practice of deferring to a child's educa-
tional and religious wishes in the face of her parent's religious opposition "Would give
rise to grave questions of religious freedom." Id. at 231-32.
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fails to take account of the child's own assessment of her re-
ligious interests.14  The recognition of independent rights of
children would require, at a minimum, a recrafting of the
balancing test to account for their own religious views.
B. Parents Claims Against Each Other
In the custody context, the State's involvement in the re-
ligious conflict is once removed. Here, again, we have parents
with views about the proper religious upbringing for their
children and, again, these views reflect their assessment of
some combination of their children's interests and their own.
Again, parental implementation of these views is resisted, but
in this case the resistance comes from the other parent. In
custody cases, courts in most states are expressly charged
with resolving disputes between parents in a manner that
serves children's best interests,5 but this best interest mis-
sion has been interpreted to be qualified by parents' consti-
tutional rights of free exercise.' This qualification can be
viewed as an interpretation of best interests (that is, defer-
ence to parents' religious beliefs serves children's best inter-
14 It could be argued that the battle over control of children's upbringing Is really
a battle over how best to prepare the child to exercise her rights independently as an
adult. See Joel Feinberg, The Childs Rfght to an Open Future. in WHOSE CHILD?
CHILDREN'S RIGHTS, PARErAL AUTHORrIy. AND STATE POWER 126 (Wflliam Alken &
Hugh LaFollette eds., 1980) (calling for the recognition of a child's "right to an open
future," the right to have options preserved until the child is old enough to choose
among them). In this battle, the State seeks to increase the child's knowledge and
skills to prepare her for a range of possible careers and ways of life. whereas the
Amish parents seek to give her the skills and sense of religious identity that will en-
able her to embrace the Amish Order through adult baptism. However, this is sim-
ply another way of conceding that religious exercise rights are not rights afforded to
children.
15 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.060 (MICHIE 1996); UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIvORCE
AcT § 402, 9A U.L.A. 561 (1987). Although some states have recently substituted a
"primary caretaker" presumption for the undefined best interest standard, see. e.g..
Rhodes v. Rhodes, 449 S.E.2d 75 (W. Va. 1994). this presumption only guides the
court's assignment of primary custodial responsibilities. It does not resolve subsidi-
ary questions, such as the extent to which the court should exercise control over the
religious activities to which either parent exposes the child, which are presumably
still governed by the best interest standard.
16 See, e.g., Zurmmo v. Zummo. 574 A.2d 1130. 1157 (Pa. Super. 1990) (lIn order
to justify restrictions upon parent's rights to inculcate religious beliefs in their chil-
dren, the party seeking the restriction must demonstrate by competent evidence that
the belief or practice of the party to be restricted actually presents a substantial
threat of present or future physical or emotional harm to the particular child ... .":
In re Marriage of Hadeen, 619 P.2d 374. 380 (Wash. App. 1980) (citing Yoder for the
proposition that parents' religious beliefs and practices cannot Influence custody
determinations absent a showing that such beliefs and practices threaten the child's
health or safety).
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ests), or a limited exception to the application of the rule (def-
erence to parents' religious beliefs is compelled by the Con-
stitution even if such deference might not serve children's
interests, absent some affirmative showing of harm).
In the custody context, as in Yoder and its progeny, courts
have not focused on the question of whether children have
separately cognizable rights of religious exercise."7 The cus-
tody courts have, however, paid more attention to the ques-
tion of children's views than in cases in which the contest is
framed as one between the parents and the State." This
greater attention to children's views is due in part to parents'
urging, where those views are expected to bolster a parental
position, 9 and in part to the conventions of custody litigation,
where courts have long recognized the value of soliciting chil-
dren's views, 0 and legislatures are increasingly requiring this
input.2 1 When parents turn to the State for assistance in re-
solving how to allocate decision-making about their children's
upbringing between them, they have declared their inability
to serve as the surrogate champion of their children's inter-
ests without State assistance. Where the parents disagree in
their interpretations of their children's interests, the views of
the children sometimes become an important source of in-
formation in resolving the dispute.22
17 See, e.g., Zummo, 574 A.2d at 1149-50 (noting that, because the children as-
serted no independent religious rights, the court need not resolve whether they had
any isuch rights).
See, e.g., Andros v. Andros, 396 N.W.2d 917. 921 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (re-
porting that children had disclosed to the judge in chambers their view that they did
not wish to go to their father's faith healing meetings); S.E.L. v. J.W.W., 541 N.Y.S.2d
675, 679-80 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1989) (describing child's statements about her religious
wishes, made to testifying expert).
19 See, e.g., Goodman v. Goodman, 141 N.W.2d 445 (Neb. 1966) (noting mother's
"heavy" reliance, in pressing for modification of custody order, on a "slight preference
expressed by the children for their mother's custody and religion); Martin v. Martin,
123 N.E.2d 812 (N.Y. 1954) (per curiam) (considering mother's motion to modify
custody judgment supported by testimony of son). Cf. Elizabeth S. Scott et al., Chil-
dren's Preference in Adjudicated Custody Decisions, 22 GA. L. REV. 1035, 1047 (1988)
(noting that judicial interviews with children about custody issues, more generally,
were usually requested by one of the parents' attorneys).
20 See Scott et al., supra note 19, at 1046-47 (reporting results of a study of Vir-
ginia judges indicating that 'the vast majority of judges reported that they routinely
attempted in some way to get information about older children's wishes" and 65%
even solicited this information about children as young as six); see also Margaret B.
v. Jeffrey B., 435 N.Y.S.2d 499 (1980) (noting that the record reveals that the chil-
dren do not wish to participate in their father's religion, and that these wishes are a
factor to be considered by the court).
21 See Scott et al., supra note 19, at 1039 ("Increasingly, judges are directed by
statute to solicit and consider the child's wishes.").
2 See id. at 1040 (noting that children's input may improve decision making on
custodial issues).
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But this common consideration of children's viewpoints in
the custody context does not amount to affording independ-
ent rights to children, for courts generally ignore these view-
points in cases where the parents agree. Even where par-
ents are no longer functioning as a single family unit, the
courts defer to the parents' presentation of a unified front on
any particular custody-related matter.' If a child possessed
independently recognized rights of free exercise, she could
press the court to consider her religious views, regardless of
whether her parents had reached agreement about her relig-
ious education and exposure.
II. CHILDREN'S RIGHT OF FREE EXERCISE
A. Children's Rights Under the Constitution
In In re Gault the Supreme Court declared that "neither
the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults
alone."2 In a series of cases that followed over the next two
decades, the Court declared repeatedly that children, as well
as adults, have constitutional rights. The extent to which
these rights would be recognized when they conflicted with
those of their parents, however, was and remains far less
clear. Indeed, in most of the cases in which bold declarations
about children's rights are made, children's interests and
views are indistinguishable from those of their parents.27
23 See Katherine Hunt Federle, Looking Ahea An Empowerment Perspective on
the Rfghts of Children. 68 TEMPLE L. REV. 1585, 1599-1600 (1995) (describing a
child's lack of opportunity for input where parents settle their custody dispute out of
court).
24 See ki. (noting that courts will defer to terms agreed to by parents even If those
terms reflect a parent's willingness to compromise her child's Interests to obtain
some unrelated favorable concession).
387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967).
See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth. 428 U.S. 52. 74 (1976)
("Constitutional rights do not mature and come Into being magically only as one at-
tains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by
the Constitution and possess constitutional rights."); Tinker v. Des Moines ndep.
Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) ("First Amendment rights, applied
in light of the special characteristics of the school environment. are available to
teachers and students.").
In Tinker, the children's protest of the Vietnam conflict was consistent with the
views and actions of their parents. See 393 U.S. at 504 ("Petitioners and their par-
ents had previously engaged in similar activities, and they decided to participate in
the plan... to wear black armbands" to show their opposition to the U.S. involve-
ment in Vietnam). In Gault, the Court grouped the child's interest in liberty and the
parent's interest in custody together, and even suggested that the constitutional
ights it recognized were shared between parent and child. See 387 U.S. at 42 (dis-
.ussing "the right to counsel which [the mother] and her juvenile son had").
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In contrast, in cases where assertions of children's con-
stitutional rights are directly or indirectly at odds with those
of their parents, children have commonly failed to secure
separate constitutional protection.2 In Parham v. J.R., a case
where this conflict may have been posed most starkly, the
Supreme Court determined that whatever liberty interests
were implicated for a child by the threat of State confinement
in a mental hospital were "inextricably linked with the par-
ents' interest in and obligation for the welfare and health of
the child."29 For this reason, the Court concluded that the
private interests weighed in its Mathews v. Eldridge due proc-
ess balancing analysis" should include "a combination of the
child's and the parent's concerns."' Once parents' and chil-
dren's interests were elided, the Court had little difficulty
concluding that the child's due process rights were not vio-
lated by placing control of psychiatric commitment decisions
in the hands of the child's parents and admitting medical
personnel."
The one notable exception to this parent-deferential ap-
proach to the recognition of children's constitutional rights is
the Court's analysis of a minor's right to obtain an abortion,
an approach set out most thoroughly in Bellotti v. Baird.33 In
Bellotti, the Court considered the constitutionality of abortion
regulations that required a minor to secure parental consent
before obtaining an abortion. Building upon an earlier ruling
reconiing a minor's constitutional right to secure an abor-
tion, the plurality opinion in Bellotti suggested three reasons
2' See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 130-31 (1988) (concluding that
child lacks a liberty interest in maintaining filial relationship with biological father
where that interest conflicts with legal father's constitutionally protected parental
interest); In re Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d 324, 339 (I1. 1995) (concluding that the child
had no protected liberty interest in maintaining relationship with foster parents
where such a relationship would interfere with the biological father's exercise of his
parental rights). While the constitutional rights of parents were not at Issue in Ha-
zelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988), one interpretation of the
Court's different approach to the reach of First Amendment protection in Hazelwood
and Tinker is that the views of parents and children were aligned in Tinker and at
least potentially at odds in Hazelwood. Indeed, one of the grounds for censoring the
student article on divorce was that the principal "believed that the student's parents
should have been given an opportunity to respond to... remarks [about them] or to
consent to their publication". 484 U.S. at 263.
442 U.S. 584, 600 (1979).
See generally 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (explaining that "the specific dictates of
due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors").
Parham, 442 U.S. at 606.
See Id. at 616.
33 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (invalidating a Massachusetts statute which required mi-
nors to obtain parental consent before undergoing an abortion).
See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 72-75 (1976)
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to justify some circumscription of this and other constitu-
tional rights when applied to children: "the peculiar vulner-
ability of children; their inability to make critical decisions in
an informed, mature manner; and the importance of the pa-
rental role in child rearing."'m Although the plurality did not
provide a clear account of how these three considerations
motivated its decision, it is clear that the pressing nature of
the abortion decisione and the minor's potentially impaired
decision-making capacity37 both played a large role in its ar-
ticulation of an entitlement to some form of alternative proce-
dure whereby a minor could avoid obtaining her parent's
consent by seeking authorization for an abortion from a neu-
tral, State-sponsored decision maker (generally a judge).'
The State-sponsored decision maker must authorize an abor-
tion, the Court directed, if either (1) the minor demonstrated
that she was sufficiently mature and informed to make her
own decision, or (2) the decision maker was convinced that
an abortion would serve the interests of the minor, despite
her immaturity.m
I will return to this "judicial bypass" procedure, and the
considerations that undergird it, later in this piece. For now,
suffice it to note that the process established in Bellotti is sui
generis. It is the only context in which the Court has called
for the establishment of a State-operated mechanism to fa-
cilitate the exercise of minors' constitutional rights independ-
ent of their parents' support or even knowledge.
B. Children's Independent Religious Exercise
Children's rights of religious exercise are asserted in in-
(holding that a state could not give a parent absolute veto power over a minor's
abortion decision).
5 Bellott, 443 U.S. at 634.
36 See icL at 642 (noting that a primary difference between a minor's options In the
context of abortion, and other areas of decision-making. Is that, unlike In those other
areas where exercising the option can be postponed until adulthood. -[a] pregnant
adolescent... cannot preserve for long the possibility of aborting. which effecUvely
exgres in a matter of weeks from the onset of pregnancy').
See Id. at 640 (noting that "[als immature minors often lack the ability to make
fully informed choices that take account of both immediate and long-range conse-
quences, a state reasonably may determine that parental consultation... is par-
ticularly desirable with respect to the abortion decision').
The Court made clear that the alternative procedure need not be judicial in
nature. See &L at 643 n.22 ("We do not suggest... that a State choosing to require
parental consent could not delegate the alternative procedure to a juvenile court or
an administrative agency or office.').
See id. at 643-44 (outlining the conditions under which a minor could obtain an
abortion under a parental consent scheme).
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numerable cases, but in the vast majority of them, the chil-
dren's interests identified match the parents' interests, or in-
deed, the parents are the actual motivating force behind the
litigation. Parents, litigating on their own behalf and as next
friend for their children, argue that curricular offerings,
condom distribution policies,4 compulsory education re-
quirements, and the like violate their children's free exercise
rights, as well as their own. Where children's religious beliefs
are in harmony with those of their parents, the case presents
no struggle for control, and the courts, in resolving the mat-
ter, need not worry too much about precisely whose right Is
at issue. Where, however, this commonality of beliefs is
lacking, whether or not children have free exercise rights in-
dependent of their parents' rights could be outcome determi-
native.
There is reason to expect that children, particularly ado-
lescents, will frequently perceive themselves to be at odds
with their parents on matters of religious exercise. These
disagreements, however, have not been pressed in litigation.
This lack of litigation is presumably a product of practical
and legal constraints (children lack the resources, knowledge
and procedural mechanisms to assert independent claims In
litigation) and of children's disinclination to press their dis-
agreements in the courts. The lack of litigation, however,
does not suggest that recognizing minors' independent free
exercise rights would be inappropriate, but rather, that if rec-
ognized, such rights might nevertheless be exercised spar-
ingly. I will consider the implications of this prediction after
first briefly addressing the appropriateness of recognizing
such rights.
40 See, e.g., Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir.
1987) (claiming that assigned textbooks violated the free exercise rights of parents
and their children).
41 See, e.g., Curtis v. School Comm. of Falmouth, 652 N.E.2d 580 (Mass. 1995)
(asserting that condom distribution programs violated the free exercise rights of par-
ents and children).
42 See e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 241 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(noting that the parents' motion to dismiss in the trial court "asserts. not only the
religious liberty of the adults, but also that of the children as a defense to the prose-
cutions").
43 See Elizabeth Ozorak, Social and Cognitive Influences on the Development of Re-
ligious Beliefs and Commitment in Adolescence, 28 J. FOR THE SU. STUDY OF RELIGION
448 (1984) (reporting a study finding that among children in the ninth to eleventh
grades, twenty three percent listed a different religious preference from the religion of
their parents).
44 Such claims may be made more frequently in litigation than is apparent from
published judicial decisions. Much litigation involving family disputes Is resolved by
lower courts without a published opinion.
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Bellotti can be read to support the recognition of children's
rights independent of their parents where (1) children would
be particularly burdened by being required to wait until
adulthood to exercise their rights, and (2) where children's
capacities are sufficient to exercise the rights in question.
Relying on these considerations, an argument can be made
for the recognition of children's free exercise rights. First,
although requiring children to put off the practice of their
chosen faith until adulthood would not have the same dra-
matic physical consequences as requiring a minor to "put off
the abortion decision, the burden imposed on a child could
nevertheless be profound. Religious convictions demand im-
mediate adherence. Most who believe they are commanded
by God to follow certain practices and embrace certain beliefs
do not feel at liberty to postpone the fulfillment of these most
important obligations. Moreover, children who choose to ar-
ticulate a separate religious identity from that of their parents
will generally have reasonably advanced decision-making
skills, for the development of a distinct religious identity gen-
erally occurs, not coincidentally, when their capacity for rea-
soned decision making roughly matches that of adults.'
I leave to another day a more careful consideration of
whether, and to what extent, children are entitled to free ex-
ercise protections where their religious views clash with those
of their parents. Presently, I set out only a skeleton of an ar-
gument to justify my tentative conclusion that such rights
should be recognized in order to move on to the focus of my
inquiry in this piece: even assuming children have religious
rights of their own, what role should the State play in facili-
tating children's exercise of those rights?
III.THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN FACILITATING
CHILDREN'S RELIGIOUS EXERCISE
A. State Action
In the context of adult claims of right, the State facilitates
the free exercise of religion by getting out of the way. The
constitutional protection is only a protection against state
45 See ADRIAN FURNHAI & BARRIE STACEY, YOUNG PEOPLE7S UNDERSTANDING OF
SOC=TY 123 (noting the correlation of development of cognitive skills, particularly the
ability to think in abstractions, with the development of religious beliefs): Carol A.
Markstrom, Religious Involvement and Adolescent Psychosocdal Development. 22 J. OF
ADOLESCENCE 205 (1999) (noting the connection between acquisition of capacity for
abstract thinking and development of spiritual identity).
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interference.46 The assumption underlying this construction
of the right is that, absent state interference, adults will be
able to exercise their religion as they please.
We cannot, of course, make the same assumption about
children. Children are in a relationship of dependence with
their parents, and parents exercise considerable control over
their children's actions. Parents' authority over their children
is clearly facilitated by the State. Through its laws, parents
are authorized to limit their children's movement, make
medical47 and educational choices on their children's behalf,
and even use moderate physical violence against their chil-
dren, so long as it is for a proper purpose. 9 Children, in
turn, are incapacitated by the State: their authority to act on
their own behalf is narrowly circumscribed by the law's pro-
hibition of child labor' ° and the voidability of their contracts. 5'
They do not have authority to choose with whom they will
live, and the law gives preference to custodial claims by their
46 The First Amendment prohibits congressional action prohibiting the free exer-
cise of religion, and the Fourteenth Amendment is construed to apply the same pro-
hibition to the states. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. asserting in part that "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free ex-
ercise thereof"; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, declaring in part that:
[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the juris-
diction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they
reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privi-
leges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
It should be noted that in many contexts state interference is even permitted, so long
as the interference derives from the application of a facially neutral law or policy.
See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879
(1990).
47 Parents' authority to grant or withhold consent to their children's medical
treatment was recognized at common law, see, e.g., Zoski v. Gaines, 260 N.W. 99
(Mich. 1935) (holding surgeon liable for conducting surgery on child at the direction
of city physician without parent's consent), and is now commonly provided by stat-
ute, see, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-3 (1999) (authorizing parents to consent to
their minor children's medical treatment and allowing minors to provide their own
consent in only limited circumstances).
48 See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (striking down state statute
mandating public school attendance for all children as a violation of parents' right to
direct the upbringing and education of their children).
49 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.08 (authorizing the use of force by a parent where
"the force is used for the purpose of safeguarding or promoting the welfare of the mi-
nor"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 147 ("A parent is privileged to apply such
reasonable force or to impose such reasonable confinement upon his child as he rea-
sonably believes to be necessary for its proper control, training, or education.").
50 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 203 (1994) (prohibiting employment, under most circum-
stances, of a minor under the age of sixteen).
51 See, e.g., Robert G. Edge, Voidability of Minors' Contracts: A Feudal Doctrine In a
Modem Economy, 1 GA. L. REv. 205 (1967) (describing long recognized practice of
allowing minors to void their contractual obligations).
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parents, even where strong familial attachments have devel-
oped elsewhere.5 2 A strong claim can be made that the State
is implicated every time a parent restricts the exercise of a
child's fundamental rights. While the Supreme Court in De-
Shaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services,3
rejected the argument that the State should be held respon-
sible under the Constitution for offenses committed against a
child by his father,s the Court in that case failed to take ac-
count of the State's role in confining children to the custody
and control of their parents.' 5
Stronger cases for the State's at-least-partial responsibility
for the interference with a child's free exercise rights can be
made in the two contexts that are the focus of this piece. In
cases where a court is asked to determine whether parents
should be exempted from the effect of an otherwise applicable
law, or how to allocate custodial control between two sepa-
rating parents, the State is clearly implicated in any interfer-
52 States generally give preferential consideration to the claims of parents In pri-
vate custody disputes, and limit third-party standing dramatically. See. e.g..
McGuffmn v. Overton, 542 N.W.2d 288 (Mich. 1996) (granting a long-absent father
custody of children over the objection of the partner of the deceased mother who. de-
spite her multi-year relationship with the children, was determined not to have
standing to assert a custodial claim). Moreover, states generally require parents to
be proven unfit before the child's interests n a termination of parental rights wll
even be considered. See, e.g., In re Kirchner. 649 N.E.2d 324 (Ill. 1995) (InvalIdating
order terminating father's parental rights and granting father custody of his three-
year-old son, whom he had never met. without regard to the child's attachment to
adoptive parents, because the state had failed to establish the father's unfitness be-
fore terminating his rights). This parental preference has been afforded constitu-
tional protection. See, e.g., Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equal. &
Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 846 (1977) (concluding that "[wjhatever liberty interest might
otherwise exist in the foster family as an institution [to maintain its relationship with
a foster child living in its home for over a year] that Interest must be substantially
attenuated where the proposed removal from the foster family is to return the child
to his natural parents."); cf. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (concluding
that the due process clause requires parental unfitness to be proven by clear and
convincing evidence before parental rights are terminated).
W 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
54 See L at 191.
55 In DeShaney, the Court conceived the issue presented In purely passive form.
asking whether a child's rights were violated where the state failed to step in to pre-
vent harm. See &d. at 194 (stating the issue involved as 'When, If ever. the failure of
a state or local government entity or its agents to provide an individual with ade-
quate protective services constitutes a violation of the individual's due process
rights). The Court's failure to address the role the state played In subjecting the
child to his father's control is particularly striking In this case, where the state was
involved in authorizing custody, after divorce, to the father, and authorizing return
to the father, after the son was removed based on suspicions of abuse. See David A.
Strauss. Due Process, Government Inaction. and Private Wrongs. 1989 SUP. Cr. REV.
53, 64-68 (1989) (arguing that the Court overlooked the state's responsibility for
placing and maintaining the child In his father's custody).
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ence with a child's religious exercise rights that follows from
the court's determination.
Where the State steps in to resolve religiously inspired
grievances affecting children, the resolution of those griev-
ances constitutes state action which could, in turn, give rise
to a free exercise claim asserted by the affected child. Al-
though the Supreme Court has recently exempted from con-
stitutional challenge state actions that are facially neutral to-
ward religion,56 the religious focus of the courts' analysis in
these cases affecting children will prevent the analysis from
being characterized as neutral. Should a child wish to chal-
lenge the court's determination that her parents need not
send her to school, or her father need not take her to Sunday
school, she should be successful in arguing that the determi-
nation constituted non-neutral state action. 
7
B. Ascertaining the Child's Religious Views
If children have constitutionally protected free exercise
rights independent of their parents' rights, and if non-neutral
state action occurs in all cases in which the court is called
upon to resolve parents' claims of authority to control the re-
ligious upbringing of their children, then the State risks in-
terfering with children's free exercise rights every time it re-
solves such a claim. To avoid inadvertent rights violations,
nothing seems more natural than to ascertain the child's re-
ligious views, as Justice Douglas proposed.' If such views
could be extracted from the child without the child's aware-
ness or involvement, they might well serve not only the
court's attempt to protect the child's rights, but also the
court's service of the child's best interests. It is my view,
however, that such a painless extraction is impossible. While
in any individual case this inquiry might facilitate a child's
exercise of her rights or the rendering of good decisions on
her behalf, these potential benefits are outweighed by the
See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith. 494 U.S. 872, 879
(1990) (holding that "the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the
obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general applicability on the
grounds the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct his religion prescribes (pro-
scribes)'" (internal citations omitted)). In Smith, the Court distinguished cases such
as Yoder, which "involved the free exercise clause in conjunction with other consU-
tutional protections." Id. at 881-82.
57 In Smith, the Supreme Court held that a religiously motivated objection to fa-
cially neutral laws did not entitle the objector to protection from enforcement under
the free exercise clause. See id. at 879.
58 See generally, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 241-49 (1972) (Douglas. J..
dissenting).
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considerable risk of harm created by the inquiry. In most
cases where the child has religious views that depart from
those of her parents, such an inquiry will either yield useless
information (inspired by the child's distrust of the process), or
traumatic and costly disclosure. Under either scenario, the
encounter harms the child.
1. Frieda Yoder. Justice Douglas's dissent applied to only
two of the three cases consolidated before the Court in Yoder,
because he noted that "Frieda Yoder has in fact testified that
her own religious views are opposed to high-school educa-
tion," and he therefore "join[ed] the judgment of the Court as
to respondent Jonas Yoder [Frieda's father]#. 9 In fact, Frieda
was called to testify in open court in front of the entire as-
semblage of lawyers, judges, and interested onlookers, in-
cluding her family's minister, who had already testified as to
the religious importance of 'reventing her from attending
school after the eighth grade. Further, she was asked a se-
ries of leading questions by counsel for the Amish parents
and by counsel for the State. If we are ever to be concerned
59 406 U.S. at 243.
60 See Trial Hearing on Attendance of Amish Children at the New Glarus Public
Schools at 79, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 243 (1972) (Testimony of Reverend
Reuben Hirschberger).
61 See i. at 92-95, (Testimony of Frieda Yoder). Examination by 1parents' coun-
sell:
Q: Frieda, I won't ask you many questions, how old are you?
A- 15
Q: Do you believe in the Amish religion?
A: Yes.
Q: Do you want to live according to the way of your people?
A. Yes.
Q: The Amish way?
A: Yes.
Q: Do you live that way now?
A: Yes.
Q: Would your going to high school be against your religious belief. Frieda?
A: Yes.
Q: Are you the daughter of Jonas Yoder?
A: Yes.
That is all.
Cross-examination by [counsel for the state]:
Q: Frieda, you graduated from 8th grade?
A: Yes.
Q: When was that, last spring?
A: Yes.
Q: [Defense counsel] asked you, and I think you said that you vanted to be
brought up in the Amish religion, is that right?
A: Yes.
Q: Now Frieda, otherwise you would be able to attend high school physically.
if you were free of religion you could attend, you could walk or get there on the
bus?
A: Yes.
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about adults dominating children and controlling children's
articulation of their views, we should be concerned about
Frieda's treatment in this case. Asking for her viewpoint was,
in all likelihood, a meaningless display. While Frieda may, in
fact, have believed precisely what she said, and even believed
it with fervent conviction, it is impossible to ascertain
whether her words, in fact, reflect such true beliefs. Her
words could have been offered, just as easily, as the response
that she was required to make by her position in her family
and her community.
Let's assume, for a moment, that Frieda wished she could
attend high school and that, at least to this extent, she dis-
agreed with the religious views of her parents. Would she
seize this opportunity to declare her disagreement with her
parents and her church? What would be the consequences to
her of making such a declaration? At a minimum she would
undermine her familial relationships, and probably her com-
munity-wide standing, considerably. And if the State had
attempted to act on her disagreement, what could it do to
counter her parents' resistance? Would it call out the Na-
tional Guard to escort her to school? Even if a less aggressive
enforcement mechanism was sufficient to get Frieda to
school, what effect would this daily reminder of the State's
disregard of her parent's authority, and this daily disruption
of the family's life patterns, have on Frieda's relationship with
her family? Acting on Frieda's solicited viewpoint would, at
the very least, be logistically problematic, and, in all likeli-
hood, psychologically destructive.62
Conversely, the State's failure to act after calling for the
public declaration could be equally destructive. In addition
Q: While you were in the elementary grades, 1 through 8, did you pass all
those grades?
A. No.
Q: You didn't pass all the grades?
A- All except one.
Q: Did you get a diploma from the 8th grade?
A. Yes.
Q: So I take it then, Frieda, the only reason you are not going to school, and
did not go to school since last September, is because of your religion?
A. Yes.
Q: That is the only reason?
K Yes.
That is all.
Id.
62 See Andrew S. Watson, Children, Families, and Courts: Before the Best Interests
of the Child and Parham v. J.R., 66 VA. L. REV. 653, 678-79 (1980) (arguing that the
State's piecemeal circumscription of parental authority creates significant risks for
family functioning).
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to the damage done by the declaration itself, Frieda is likely
to learn a bitter lesson if she responds with honesty, at great
personal risk, and then her view is disregarded.
Alternatively, Frieda might choose to lie, perhaps because
she would feel pressured to do so by her family and commu-
nity, or perhaps because she had a better sense than Justice
Douglas of the consequences to her life of declaring her oppo-
sition. While such an approach would leave her in control,
this control would come at a cost. Feeling forced to declare
one's principles falsely inflicts a far greater harm to one's dig-
nity than making a private choice to conceal one's true views.
Moreover, perceiving the adults' facile willingness to unques-
tioningly embrace her forced falsehoods as her true views
would surely undermine Frieda's sense that her views were of
any real importance.6 She would learn that she had a part to
play, and that her performance was successful.
Arguably, the very asking of the question- "Do you share
your parents' beliefs, Frieda?"-- imposes some harm.C Such
a question raises the prospect of intra-family division on the
State's time, not on the child's time&s Should Frieda wish to
question her family's beliefs, she should be allowed to do so
in a context that she identified as comfortable.c3 The fact that
Indeed, the lack of attention shown by the lawyer for the state to the single ap-
pareritly unexpected answer- that she had not passed every grade- may have sent
the message that what she had to say, even about a matter that was probably of
some significance to her, was not a matter of much interest to the lawyer or the
court. See supra note 61.
This can be compared to the harm anticipated by the Court in Parham v. J.R. if
the State convened an adversarial proceeding every time a child disagreed with his
parent's determination that he needed mental health treatment. See generally 442
U.S. 584 (1978). In that context, the Court worried that the very adversarial nature
of the proceeding would undermine parents' authority and effectiveness in facilitat-
ingongoing treatment. Id. at 610.
My closest direct experience with this kind of questioning was in the context of
child protection proceedings, during which I would ask my child clients questions
such as "Do you want to live with your mother?" The very asking of these questions
by a somewhat important looking professional adult appeared to facilitate the al-
ienation between child and parent. In the context of those proceedings. however.
division had already been introduced Into the family by the allegations of abuse and
neglect and, if those allegations were true, by the underlying abuse. Moreover, in
many cases, separation of parent and child was inevitable, so the harm caused by
divisive questioning was almost certainly reduced, and the benefit of learning some-
thing about the child's views almost certainly increased. In the world of Frieda Yo-
der, however, there was no reason to anticipate family rupture.
Indeed, many Old Order Amish communities support a tradition of rumspringa
("running around" time) during which older adolescents are allowed to explore non-
Amish ways and depart from the traditional restrictions imposed by their religion.
See Its Party Time! An Evening with Amish Youth. LANCASTER NEw ERA. Aug. 6. 1998
at Al (describing the tradition of rumspringa). The goal of rumspringa is to give
youth, prior to adult baptism, a chance to experiment and question, in the hope that
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such opportunities might not be offered to her privately does
not justify the State's offering its clumsy, ill-timed assistance.
The State is simply too powerful and too disconnected from
Frieda and her community to engage in such a delicate in-
quiry. 67 Penn
2. Adam Zummo. In Zummo v. Zummo, the nnsylvania
Superior Court considered the constraints imposed by the
constitutional right of free exercise of religion on the authority
of a custody court to limit a parent's control over his chil-
dren's religious upbringing. Zummo involved a family com-
posed of a Jewish mother and a Roman Catholic father.8
Pursuant to an oral pre-nuptial agreement between the par-
ents, all three children were raised in the Jewish faith.69
When the couple divorced, they agreed to share legal custody
of the children (then three, four, and eight), and to give pri-
mary physical custody to the mother."° They turned to the
courts for assistance, however, in resolving their dispute
about the father's authority to take the children to Roman
Catholic services and his obligation to take them to Jewish
Sunday School during his alternate weekend visits.
71
In entering an order circumscribing the father's control of
the children's religious education, the trial court stated that
the children had been "'assiduously' grounded in the Jewish
faith and the children should be permitted to continue in
'their chosen faith.' 71 While the Superior Court rejected both
the conclusion that the children were "assiduously grounded"
in Judaism, and that Judaism was their "chosen faith," it ap-
pears that, in fact, the record sugported the conclusion that
their family identity was Jewish, but did not support the
conclusion that the children had "chosen" Judaism. There
was no evidence to suggest that any of the children had ex-
pressed a position about their religious identity, let alone
whether it was an identity that they wanted. The Superior
Court noted that whether the children had independent re-
ligious rights was an open question, but a question it need
this experience will eventually lead them back to the Amish practices, more confident
for knowing something about the world which they are giving up. See Id.
67 See Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130 (Pa. Super. 1990).
68 See iLd. at 1141.
69 See id.
70 See id.
71 See ic.
7 Id. at 1148.
73 See ic. at 1141 (noting that "Idjuring the marriage, the Zummo family partici-
pated fully in the life of the Jewish faith and community ... they celebrated the
Sabbath every Friday night and attended all the high holiday services").
74 See id. at 1148.
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not address because no such rights had been asserted. 7s It
then went on to conclude that the father could not be pre-
vented from taking the children to Roman Catholic Mass
without violating his constitutional right of free exercise."
The consideration of the costs and benefits of soliciting
children's religious views shifts, to some extent, in the con-
text of custody disputes. Most significantly, the harm im-
posed by the court by probing children's views in this context
may be considerably reduced. First, the family is already
fractured. While calling on the child to take a position could
further undermine the various familial relationships, it would
not be the original, nor is it likely to be the primary, source of
family discord.' Second, because the parents are engaged in
a disagreement about the proper religious upbringing for
their children, and particularly if the dispute has produced
arguments between the parents within the children's hearing,
these children are more likely to have considered their own
views about how they would, for example, like to spend their
weekends. Indeed, in many such cases, both parents will
have already probed the children themselves for evidence of a
supportive viewpoint. Third, children who are the subject of
custody disputes are already involved in litigation that often
leads the court to solicit their viewpoint on a range of issues,
including where, and with which parent, they prefer to live.'
In this context, inquiring into the child's view of his own
religious identity may be perceived, by both parent and child,
as less intrusive. The original family arrangement has been
destroyed, and the family itself has turned to the court for
assistance in organizing an alternate arrangement. While the
appropriateness of asking children with whom they want to
live is hotly debated among psychologists and lawyers,7 it is
likely that the cost and benefits to children of having their re-
75 See id. at 1149. The court failed to consider, however, whether It was under
an T obligation to ask the children for their views.
See id. at 1150.
77 Of course, this argument could cut the other way: where children are experi-
encing the emotional trauma often associated with divorce, they may be especially
vulnerable to the emotional harm associated with being called upon to pick sides.
See Scott et al., supra note 19, at 1041-42 (citing sources contending that soliciting
children's viewpoints in custody disputes imposes stress and Is potentially psycho-
logically harmful). As I argue later in this piece, an assessment of the risk of trauma
associated with asking a child to take a position on religious questions should be
tied into the broader assessment of risks associated with asking a child to take a po-
sition on other custody-related matters.
78 See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
See Scott et al., supra note 19. at 1041-42 (citing to sources favoring and op-
posing the solicitation of and reliance on children's viewpoints in custody proceed-
ings).
Dec. 19991
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
ligious views solicited will roughly track the harms and bene-
fits that come with viewpoint solicitation more generally."
C. The Judicial Bypass Model
In the abortion context, the Supreme Court went out of its
way to suggest a mechanism by which states could be In-
formed of a minor's desire to have an abortion, and could
authorize action in conformity with that desire, all without
notice to the minor's parents.' The judicial mechanism em-
braced in Bellotti demonstrated both the Court's commitment
to the recognition and protection of children's constitutional
rights, and its willingness to circumscribe those rights in
light of children's particular vulnerabilities, impaired deci-
sion-making, and dependence upon their parents. 2 The
Court recognized a minor's right to have an abortion, even
without parental consent, but allowed states to impose some
limits to encourage intra-familial resolution of the issue.' To
accommodate minors whose attempts at intra-familial reso-
lution failed, or who judged an attempt at such a resolution
too risky to even venture, the Court required states to develop
another means by which a minor could either establish her
maturity to make the decision on her own, or convince an
authoritative adult that an abortion was in her best interest.4
In some sense, the judicial bypass procedure represents a
remarkably generous granting of rights to children. A minor
who can convince a judge of her maturity, regardless of age,
can decide, on her own, whether she wants to have an abor-
tion. Even where such maturity cannot be established, the
minor is granted the authority to go outside the parental re-
lationship to obtain consent based on considerations of her
interests alone. In another respect, however, minors' abor-
80 Some courts attempt to minimize the harm and enhance the benefits of solicit-
ing children's views by asking questions designed to illicit indirect evidence of these
views rather than asking the child to confront the choices directly. See RICHARD A.
GARDNER, FAMILIAL EVALUATION IN CHILD CUSTODY LITIGATION, 171-75 (1982) (suggest-
ing lines of questioning that an examiner can pursue to elicit information about the
child's custodial preferences indirectly); see also Scott et al., supra note 19, at 1047-
50 (reporting that many of the surveyed Virginia judges "never asked younger chil-
dren directly about their preferences. Rather . .. [they] typically attempted to dis-
cern preference through indirect questions or through the child's unsolicited com-
ments").
81 See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 642-44 (1979).
82 See id. at 634.
See id at 637-42.
See id. at 643-44 (requiring states to allow a minor to obtain an abortion
without obtaining parental consent by means of an alternative procedure before an
authoritative adult).
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tion rights are dramatically circumscribed. Unlike the adult
woman, who can simply walk into the abortion clinic and ar-
range for the procedure, a minor must first go through a gru-
eling judicial procedure at which she must announce the fact
of her pregnancy and, often, her reasons for seeking to termi-
nate it to an unknown authority figure. She has to endure
the possible indignity of being assessed for her maturity
through a series of questions.8 Many minors have described
the judicial bypass procedure as far more traumatic than the
abortion itself. Moreover, the delays imposed by the bypass
requirements can push the abortion from a relatively routine
procedure to a more medically complex and risky one.'
It could be argued that the successful negotiation of the
logistically intimidating and emotionally traumatic bypass
procedure serves as an effective proxy for a minor's prepar-
edness to take on decision making independent of family
members. If the minor makes it through this system she has
proved her competence, the authenticity and stability of her
decision, and her ability to operate independent of family
supports.m A process that demands this much of minors
seeking abortions may well be flawed, however, for it will
surely screen out many minors who are clear in their desire
to have an abortion, but who lack the wherewithal, or the
85 See In re Mary Moe, 423 N.E.2d 1038. 1040 n.1 (Mass. CL App. 1981) (sug-
gesting that the judge's assessment of maturity should consider the minor's tone of
voice, expression and demeanor, her understanding of child rearing and Its conse-
quences on education and her knowledge of the medical risks involved).
86 See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417. 476 (1990) (quoting district court
findings that "the experience of going to court for a judicial authorization produces
fear and tension in many minors" who are intimidated by the judicial authority figure
and resentful at being forced to share intimate details of their personal lives, and
that "[some minors are so upset by the bypass proceeding that they consider It more
difficult than the medical procedure Itself").
See Gary Melton, Legal Regulation of Adolescent Abortiorn Unintended Effects.
42 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 79, 80 (1987) (noting that the judicial bypass process intro-
duces delays which, in turn, 'increase the medical and psychological risks associ-
ated with abortion"); Susanne Yates & Anita Pliner, Judging Maturity In the Courts:
The Massachusetts Consent Statute, 78 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 646. 648 (1988)
(documenting delays ranging from one to thirty-nine days between the time a minor
contacted a lawyer and the time the hearing was held); see also R. Anthanaslou et
al., Psychiatric Sequelae to Term Birth and Induced Early and Late Aborttorn A Long-
tudinal Study, 5 FAM. PLANNING PERSPS. 227, 227 (1973) (suggesting that the risk that
an individual will suffer negative psychological effects from having an abortion may
increase in the second trimester).
88 Virtually all minors who go through the judicial bypass procedure are found to
be mature. See ROBERT H. MNOO1iN, THE INTERESrS OF CHILDREN: ADVOCACY. LAW
REFORM, AND PuBuc POLICY 239 (1985) (reporting that of the 1300 pregnant minors
who sought authorization for abortions through judicial bypasses between 1981 and
1983, 90% were found to be mature); Yates & Pliner. supra note 87. at 647 (finding
that only nine out of 477 minors were found to be immature).
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fortitude, to endure the judicial bypass process. In the con-
text of teen pregnancy, a system that is so rigorous that It
screens out some minors who want abortions but who are
afraid to discuss the topic with their families or a judge
seems to reflect a foolish allocation of the risk of error.
D. From Abortion to Free Exercise
In the context of children's potential free exercise claims,
in contrast, a system that requires considerable initiative on
the part of the minor in asserting the claim would reflect a
proper allocation of risk. Surely such a system would screen
out some legitimate, authentic claims of minors to exercise
their religion independent of their parents, but it would also
protect children entirely from the intrusive inquiry of the
State and from the forced identification of a religious view,
translated into a legal claim by an overzealous search for un-
articulated rights violations. This, in my view, is the right
balance, particularly in light of the fact that religious convic-
tions, in stark contrast to the abortion decision, can be nur-
tured in private, and acted upon in adulthood. Indeed such a
progression in children's development of a spiritual identity is
common.8
While I am inclined to recognize a child's right of free re-
ligious exercise, regardless of whether or not their chosen be-
liefs and practices conform with those of their parents, I
would leave it to children to take the initiative in identifying
their religious claims. I would eliminate all procedural obsta-
cles that would prevent children from asserting such claims,
either in their own litigation,' or as part of their parents'
suits.91 As in the abortion context, I would ensure that law-
89 See generally, Raymond H. Potvin & Che-Fu Lee, Adolescent Rellglon A Devel-
opmental Approach, 43 SOC. ANALYSIS 131 (1982) (reporting results of study sug-
gesting that adolescents' concept of their religion develops from a focus on parent-
controlled religious practice to a peer-oriented exploration of beliefs to a re-
orientation toward practice once they have embraced a belief system of their own).
90 I would favor, for example, eliminating any requirement that a "next friend" or
guardian at [item be appointed to represent the minor in litigation. See, e.g., FED. R.
CIV. P. 17(c) (requiring the court to appoint a guardian ad litem for infants or incom-
petent persons not otherwise represented).
91 Children asserting religious interests that conflict with the interests asserted by
their parents in litigation should be authorized to intervene as of right. See, e.g..
FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a) declaring:
Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action
... when the applicant claims an interest relating to the.., subject of the ac-
tion and the applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a
practical matter impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect that inter-
est.
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yers are available, free of charge, to assist minors who self-
identify.9 But in my view, other than eliminating these pro-
cedural obstacles, the State should do nothing to promote a
child's independent religious exercise unless and until the
child solicits state aid. Where the child does self-identify and
is found by a court to have a valid claim that her religious ex-
ercise is being impeded,' the State may well have a role to
play in ensuring that the child's rights are protected. If the
child cannot exercise her right without obtaining independ-
ence from her parents, the State may be obligated to remove
State-imposed obstacles to achieving that independence." Of
course, as with all free exercise claims, the court would con-
sider what State interests are served by maintaining those
obstacles to independence. The classic interest would pre-
sumably be the interest in ensuring that children grow up to
become healthy, self-sufficient adults, which in some cases
would justify maintaining the child's position of dependence,
even at the expense of her ability to exercise her religious
rights.
See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-241(V) (providing that. in bypass proceedings.
"Ithe court shall advise the minor that she has a right to counsel and shall, upon
her request, appoint counsel for her).
The Court would ask the same questions it asks of adults litigants to ascertain
the validity of their free exercise claims. Pursuant to Employment DLvtsfon. Depart-
mentofHumanResources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). It would be required to find
that the State action in question was not facially neutral. See supra note 58. Sec-
ond, it would consider whether the objection to the state action in question was mo-
tivated by sincerely held religious convictions and whether the litigants ability to act
on those convictions was in fact impeded by the state action. See Wisconsin v. Yo-
der, 406 U.S. 205, 215-19 (1972) (noting that Amish parents' practices that were at
odds with the compulsory attendance law were only entitled to constitutional protec-
tion under the Free Exercise clause if religiously grounded. and threatened wvith seri-
ous disruption if the law was enforced against them).
94 For example, the State might be obligated to recognize a minor's emancipated
status or, more particularly, grant the minor authority to sign a lease, self-register
for school, or secure a job, despite general age restrictions to the contrary. This
modification of a minor's legal authority to act on her own behalf could be likened to
the common practice, in many states, of granting enhanced legal authority to minors
who have married or become parents. See. e.g.. MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-3 (1999)
(authorizing married minors to give consent for their own medical treatment and mi-
nor parents to consent to the medical treatment of their children). As in those con-
texts, granting additional legal authority to minors who have decided to assert an
independent religious identity can be Justified by some combination of necessity
(they have taken on additional responsibilities which the additional authority will
help them meet) and appropriateness (they have reflected their preparedness to take
on these responsibilities).
95 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
If, for example, a twelve-year-old sought the State's assistance in separating
from her family to pursue her independent religious convictions, a court might well
conclude that the State's interest in ensuring that the child was adequately pro-
tected, nurtured and supported was sufficiently compelling to justify denying the
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In the custody context I would modify this approach only
slightly, by allowing courts to inquire into issues of religious
identity, even when not raised by the child, under the same
circumstances in which they would inquire more generally
into the child's views about other custody issues. Where a
clear view emerges as a result of that inquiry that includes an
express rejection of one parent's religion, the embracing of
the other parent's faith, and an indication of discomfort,
rather than simply disinterest, in the activities associated
with the rejected religion, courts should limit or prohibit the
child's engagement with the rejected religion accordingly.
Where the child's views, however, reflect any ambiguity, or
lack of strong conviction, courts should only intervene to the
extent necessary to ensure that both parents' choices re-
garding religious upbringing are honored and that the expo-
sure to the two sets of religious beliefs and practices in ques-
tion does not cause emotional or psychological harm to the
child .97
IV. CONCLUSION
My proposal is far from utopian. I propose to trade away
some amount of protection for a child's right to live and wor-
ship according to her conscience in exchange for protection
from the State's destructive efforts to facilitate the exercise of
such rights. Perhaps implementation of the modified pro-
posal in the custody context, which offers the State a modest
opportunity to probe children's religious views in cases where
such probing is adjudged to serve the child's interests, would
teach us something about children's self-perceptions about
religious identity, as well as how to inquire about those per-
ceptions, with minimal intrusion on children's ongoing devel-
opment.
child's religious claim.
97 As noted earlier, this is the basic standard that is currently applied in resolving
disputes between separated parents over control of their children's religious up-
bringing. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. As in the context of claims
brought by parents seeking protection from the application of state laws, I advocate
maintaining the status quo, in the absence of affirmative assertions of religious views
by minors.
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